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Commentary
Katherine Swartz 
Harvard School of Public Health
I thought maybe that cold air was supposed to make us more cog 
nizant of what it's like to be one of the unfortunates. I've been asked to 
pinch-hit as a discussant on these three papers, so let me try to do a rea 
sonable job here I want to focus my comments more about the aspect 
that Karen just talked about, the dynamic issues involved with job loss, 
income, and health insurance coverage. That is to say, if we start with 
a job loss, that increases the probability (as Ann was describing) that a 
person will have a subsequent job loss, and all of this has ripple effects 
on a person's pension, the ability to save (and therefore what kinds of 
nonpension savings a person has when starting retirement), and on 
health insurance. These papers highlight the dynamic issues that are 
involved here. We have unemployment spells, spells without health 
insurance, and spells that are short-lived (we hope) of having poor 
health.
The first comment I want to make has to do with the bank merger 
case study. I found this especially interesting because many people 
who lose jobs in these huge bank mergers are lower-wage, less-edu 
cated groups of workers. Judging by the response rates to the study's 
survey, however, the study has respondents who happen to be older 
workers who were better educated and had higher incomes when they 
lost their jobs.
I happen to live in Boston now, and as some of you know, Boston 
(and New England) has been experiencing bank mergers recently. I 
can tell you from colleagues and friends that the recent Bank Boston 
merger with Fleet Bank targeted older employees for severance. 
They've been provided with very generous severance packages in 
part because of their long tenure with the banks so "that the bank 
would not be sued for the age discrimination that Jill talks about in her 
paper. Her discussion of this issue resonated with what I am observing 
in Boston.
However, what I found distressing about this case study is that I'm 
seeing similar subtleties at work now in other types of firms and not
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just banks. For example, we now see changes in job descriptions that 
are intended to drive workers from their jobs. Changes such as requir 
ing a worker to know how to use a new computer system or a new 
accounting system are not uncommon. At the same time, employers 
are not doing enough of the training, which Wally Maher and Dave 
Smith talked about earlier, that would enable workers to learn the new 
systems. This situation then leads to what appears to be a voluntary 
change of job, so you have a voluntary spell without a job. Or is this 
really a "push and shove" and an involuntary job change? The inter 
pretation, of course, has impacts on the kinds of health insurance one 
may have, what happens to one's pensions, and what happens to one's 
current income and ability to save.
I find all of this quite chilling. It leads again to the comment that 
Burt Seidman raised earlier about some kind of balance being needed 
between flexibility for employers in terms of their employee labor 
costs and protections for workers. Employers do need flexibility with 
labor; as we have seen in Western Europe, employers complain vocif 
erously about all of their labor costs tied up with fringe benefits. On 
the other hand, there is a need for employee protections, particularly 
for workers 50 and older, who face higher probabilities of chronic 
health problems and demands to care for aging parents. Right now, we 
have a 10-year demographic trough in terms of the people who are 55 
to 64 years old, but I can assure you being on the leading edge of the 
baby boom, as are many of you in this room we haven't seen any 
thing yet in terms of the needs for employee protections. I suspect, 
since the baby boomers have led the way on a lot of things over the last 
50 years, we will be heard on this issue as well.
The second point I want to make has to do with the effects of job 
losses on incomes and pensions. The finding that Ann and her coau 
thor have that earnings are significantly lower after a job loss (between 
a quarter to a third less) is incredibly important for those of us who are 
studying the issue of job loss among older workers. It means that not 
only are such workers' earnings less, but so is their ability to save 
money for retirement to round out Social Security and for any health 
care costs that they're going to have to incur once they are 65 and older.
Also, the finding that pensions are no longer so connected to par 
ticular employers really does alter the incentives to retire or not and to 
change jobs. These changed incentives may increase the probability of
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having a spell without health insurance; I found that quite interesting 
and would like to see it explored further.
My third set of comments relate to the loss of jobs and the effect on 
health insurance coverage. I'll spend more time on this area since my 
own research has focused on health insurance. We're primarily talking 
here about the effects of an involuntary loss of a job. That's why my 
earlier point about how much of job changing or job loss is involuntary 
versus voluntary is really important to know. People who are married 
and who voluntarily switch jobs are very likely to be relying on a 
spouse as a source of access to health insurance. We know that losing a 
job does not necessarily cause loss of health insurance, because fre 
quently job losers or job changers are covered by health insurance from 
their spouse.
However, if a person is not married (and in my paper I show that 
the "unfortunates" are much less likely to be married), then clearly los 
ing a job increases the probability of having a spell without health 
insurance, or it increases the probability of using up a great deal of 
one's savings to be able to purchase some type of nongroup health 
insurance policy. In addition, if a person has any type of preexisting 
health condition that he/she knows about or is concerned about because 
of a familial history, then being in a spell without a job and without 
health insurance is very scary. The health condition may crop up sud 
denly and an individual may not have the money to pay for care. Older 
workers also fear that they are less likely to gain a new job because a 
potential employer may say, "Well, you look like you're a little older 
and even though I worry about age discrimination, I'll just say that the 
other person was more qualified for that job." We ought to be worried 
about these subtle effects related to preexisting health conditions and 
what they do for employment and health coverage.
A third point about job changes and health insurance (as Karen 
aptly describes) is that COBRA is not as helpful as it's cracked up to 
be. A person has to work for an employer with at least 20 employees to 
even be covered by COBRA. A person also has to have an employer 
that offers health care coverage. Thus, if an employer goes bankrupt 
and the business folds, so a worker loses his or her job, the workers do 
not have access to the former employer's health insurance. A person 
also needs to have a lot of money to retain coverage under COBRA, 
because 102 percent of a premium is a lot of money, especially if a
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former employer offers generous coverage that costs $4,000 or more 
annually.
Another issue with COBRA is that people are often misled about 
their eligibility at a time when they're most vulnerable. COBRA is 
available not just for people who lose a job voluntarily or involuntarily; 
it's also there for 36 months for people who, through divorce or the 
death of a spouse, lose their access to the employer-sponsored cover 
age they have had. Those of you who have been through such circum 
stances know that's a particularly vulnerable period of time, and yet,a 
person has only 30 days to decide to continue coverage under COBRA.
So, COBRA is not all its cracked up to be, and as Karen pointed 
out, HIPAA also does not provide much protection for people. It 
doesn't prevent insurers from increasing premiums when a person 
changes from group coverage to nongroup coverage. There's nothing 
in HIPAA that says that the insurance company can't set whatever pre 
mium it deems appropriate. Although HIPAA did help place a floor on 
the protections that individuals have when they shift from a group pol 
icy to a nongroup policy, it is still the case that the states have the right 
to regulate the nongroup, individual insurance market. These markets 
are not competitive in terms of premium competition. Rather, they are 
competitive in the way that the insurers go about selecting who they 
want to cover and who they want to stay far away from. One group that 
insurers particularly want to stay far away from is anybody over the 
age of 50. They can do this by setting high premiums, say, $15,000 to 
$20,000 a year, and most people then say, "I can't afford that." So 
technically, while older people may not be denied a policy, they really 
are not offered a policy.
Let me add one other observation about the difficulties faced by 
older people in trying to purchase affordable nongroup health insur 
ance policies. This relates to the web site Karen mentioned: I am 
struck by the fact that it is very difficult to find a high-deductible insur 
ance policy. This is also true if you have access to insurance through 
employer groups. I cannot get a high-deductible policy, and my hus 
band's employer does not offer a high-deductible insurance policy. 
Most people whom I've asked cannot get a high-deductible insurance 
policy from where they work. If you go into the nongroup market and 
try to buy a high-deductible, catastrophic policy, I suspect that you will 
find enormous difficulty because insurers are immediately suspicious.
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Somebody who wants a high-deductible policy knows something  
adverse selection is the issue. Insurers fear that you know that you 
have cancer or some kind of cardiovascular problem and you're expect 
ing to use medical care in excess of $10,000 a year.
All of which brings me back to where I started the dynamic 
aspects of income, pensions, and health insurance facing people who 
lose jobs, particularly people who are older than 50 or in the 55- to 64- 
year-old group that we're talking about in this conference. The issue 
that we really have to be thinking hard about is how do we develop 
public policies to help people during these spells or periods of time 
when they are experiencing loss of a job, loss of health insurance, loss 
of income without at the same time increasing the moral hazard 
incentives for somebody voluntarily to enter a spell without a job. I am 
very concerned about unintentionally creating incentives, then, for an 
employer to feel that somebody who is 55 to 64 years of age is expend 
able because a public safety net exists that will catch a person shoved 
from a job. How do we put in place public policies that help older 
workers in spells without jobs without at the same time increasing 
incentives for more people to enter these spells?
